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Abstract 
We investigate whether social connections of a firm’s executives and directors with brokerage 
houses that follow the firm will affect the firm’s cost of equity. We find that a firm’s cost of equity 
significantly decreases with its social connectedness with brokerages, and that the effect is more 
pronounced for firms with more soft information, opaque information environment, tight financial 
constraints, or weak corporate governance. We use two types of quasi-natural experiments to 
address endogeneity concerns: 1) exogenous brokerage exit and 2) CEO turnover with internal 
CEO replacement. We find that an exogenous reduction in firm-brokerage social connections leads 
to an economically large increase in the firm’s cost of equity, indicating that the effect of social 
connections in reducing cost of equity is likely causal. Our results are robust to using alternative 
measures of cost of equity. Further, consistent with the evidence on cost of equity, we find that 
firm-brokerage social connections improve the firm’s equity valuation.       
Keywords: Firm-brokerage Social Connections; Cost of Equity; Information Asymmetry 
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1.  Introduction 
Brokerage houses serve a crucial role in obtaining and disseminating value-relevant 
information to investors in capital markets. Brokerage houses’ social connections with 
corporate executives and directors are important conduits of information, providing brokerages 
with competitive advantage in accessing and processing public and/or private information. 
Recent studies have demonstrated how such social connections benefit brokerages and their 
employed analysts.1 For example, social connections with corporate executives and directors 
benefit brokerages with larger trading commissions and stock coverage, and benefit their 
employed analysts with more accurate forecasts and more profitable stock recommendations 
so that these analysts are more likely to become All-Stars (Cohen, Frazzini and Malloy, 2010; 
Fang and Huang, 2017; Bradley, Gokkaya and Liu, 2019a; Bradley, Gokkaya and Liu, 2019b).  
However, despite these documented benefits to brokerages and their analysts, it remains 
unclear whether and how firms can benefit from being socially linked to Wall Street 
brokerages.2 This study provides the first piece of empirical evidence on the effect of social 
connections between brokerage houses and executives and directors of a firm on one of the 
most important financial aspects of the firm—cost of equity. 
Cost of equity plays a central role in a firm’s capital budgeting and valuation processes 
and greatly affects the firm’s fortune. It is the internal rate of return that the market applies to 
the firm’s future cash flows to determine its current market value of equity. It has been well 
recognized that a firm’s information asymmetry affects its cost of equity capital (e.g., Diamond 
and Verrecchia, 1991; Easley and O’hara, 2004).3  More and better information in capital 
                                                          
1 Besides social connections with corporate executives and directors, brokerage house political connections are 
also a resource that allows sell-side analysts to collect value-relevant information so that they can issue more 
informative recommendations (Christensen, Mikhail, Walther and Wellman 2017). 
2 A survey conducted by Bank of New York Mellon based on 693 CEOs and CFOs in 2013 reported that out of 
the total time CEOs and CFOs spend with the investment community, about 20% is with sell-side analysts (Global 
Trends in Investor Relations, Bank of New York Mellon, 2013). 
3 Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) predict that information disclosure decreases information asymmetry, which 
reduces the firm’s cost of capital. Similarly, Easley and O’hara (2004) predict that a firm whose stock contains 
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markets arguably reduces investors’ uncertainty about the size and timing of future cash flows, 
thereby lowering the firm’s cost of equity (Christensen, de la Rosa and Feltham, 2010).   
A firm’s social connections with brokerages are an important channel through which the 
firm disseminates information to capital markets. It is well known that information is shared 
and diffused among colleagues and top-down in a brokerage house.4  Firm-brokerage social 
connections thus enable analysts of connected brokerages to obtain private and soft information 
from management and build a better ‘mosaic’ of value-relevant information about the firm 
through repeated interactions with management.5 Analysts’ research is extensively used by 
buy-side clients in evaluating firm performance, forming investment strategies and allocating 
resources across stocks (e.g. Francis, Lafond, Olsson and Schipper, 2005; Loh and Mian, 2006). 
Analysts of connected brokerages are more likely to convey the private and soft information 
(such as information about research and development programs, mergers and acquisitions, and 
product market competition) obtained from firm management to capital markets through their 
research reports or verbally communicating with their clients (Cohen, Frazzini and Malloy, 
2010; Bradley, Gokkay and Liu, 2019a).6 Social connections with brokerage houses also give 
corporate management opportunities to interact with important client investors of brokerages 
                                                          
relatively more private information and less public information faces a higher cost of equity. Empirical studies 
provide evidence that is generally consistent with these theory predictions (e.g., Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara, 
2002; Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper, 2005; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Hail and Leuz, 2006).  
4 For example, Brown, Call, Clement and Sharp (2015) show that group discussions and house-wide seminars are 
often held in brokerage houses, aiming to facilitate private information exchange within the house on the firms 
the analysts follow. Empirical evidence also shows that executives’ human capital including their social and 
political connections is transferred to analysts so that analysts’ forecasts are more accurate compared to cases 
where the executives lack such connections (Christensen, Mikhail, Walther and Wellman, 2017; Bradley, Gokkay 
and Liu, 2019b). Further, there is information transmission among in-house analysts and analysts discuss and 
exchange information with colleagues who cover the same industry sectors (e.g., Hwang, Liberti and Sturgess, 
2018; Phua, Tham and Wei, 2018). 
5 Analysts who have been frequently interacting with management could also be able to glean value-relevant 
information from management’s body language or vocal cues (Mayew and Venkatachalam, 2012). 
6 We had conversations with two analysts who are working and have worked in large brokerage firms. They stated 
they are more likely to have private interactions with management who were previously work-mates. While 
management is more cautious about releasing material information to analysts privately after Reg FD, the firm 
management may point out directions for analysts by suggesting them to check other analysts’ forecasts or one of 
the many business transactions. For example, one analyst indicated that management from a large firm once 
suggested she/he to have another look at the corporate merger and acquisition transaction. While the information 
is immaterial, the analyst was able to extract value-relevant information by closely scrutinizing the transaction 
and incorporate this information into their research outputs. 
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through brokerage-hosted conferences (Green, Jame, Markov and Subasi, 2014a,b; Bradley, 
Gokkaya and Liu, 2019a). These mechanisms should reduce information asymmetry in the 
stock markets on the fundamental value of the firm and result in investors charging a lower risk 
premium for holding the firm’s shares, thereby decreasing the firm’s cost of equity (Diamond 
and Verrecchia, 1991; Easley and O’hara, 2004).  
It is not obvious, however, whether the effect holds after the enactment of Regulation 
Fair Disclosure (Reg FD). 7  Reg FD has the potential to disrupt private communications 
between firm management and Wall Street, removing connected analysts’ competitive 
information advantage due to their privileged access to management. Prior evidence shows that 
analysts who share school ties with management in the covered firms are no better than their 
counterparts without such ties in issuing profitable stock recommendations in the post-Reg FD 
period, while school ties gave analysts information advantage before the regulatory change 
(e.g., Cohen, Frazzini and Malloy, 2010). If Reg FD reduces the additional private information 
flowing into stock markets through analysts, firm-brokerage social connections may not 
influence the firm’s cost of equity in the post-Reg FD era.  
Furthermore, conflicts of interest may arise particularly when brokerage houses are 
socially connected with the firms they follow. For example, analysts may be unwilling to 
downgrade a connected firm and disseminate negative news about the firm to the stock markets 
because she  or her employer is connected with the firm’s CEO.8 Major brokerage firms have 
                                                          
7 Reg FD was promulgated by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in October 2000. It requires 
companies to make significant information public simultaneously to all investors and analysts in the case of 
intentional disclosures, or within 24 hours in the case of unintentional disclosures. Mohanram and Sunder (2006), 
Agrawal, Chadha, and Chen (2006), and Gintschel and Markov (2004) find that Reg FD is effective in leveling 
the information playing field among analysts. However, recent evidence (Brown, Call, Clement and Sharp 2015, 
Solomon and Soltes 2015, Guo and Qiu 2016) suggest that selective disclosures continue to exist even in the post-
Reg FD period.    
8 Analysts’ conflicts of interest in equity research has been well documented in the literature (e.g., Das, Levine, 
and Sivaramakrishnan, 1998; Hong, Kubik, and Solomon, 2000; Gu and Wu, 2003; Hong and Kubic 2003; 
O’Brien, McNichols, and Lin, 2005; Ke and Yu, 2006; Mola and Guidolin, 2009; Groysberg, Healy, and Maber, 
2011). A Wall Street Journal article (Ng and Gryta, 2017) reports an analyst stating that “It’s a decision I have to 
make on my sell-rated stocks: whether I will forgo the opportunity for corporate access, which clients will 
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paid significant fines to settle lawsuits on biased analyst research (Swissinfo, 2002). Such 
conflicts of interest may even lead to greater information asymmetry on a connected firm’s 
value in capital markets in the post-Reg FD era, thereby resulting in higher cost of equity for 
the firm. 
Using a dataset of social connections between brokerage houses and corporate executives 
and directors obtained from BoardEx for the periods 2001 to 2016, we investigate the effect of 
firm-brokerage social connections on the connected firm’s cost of equity. We follow the 
literature and define social connections as those established via educational background, past 
co-working experiences, joint memberships in non-employment activities such as sports clubs, 
charity, voluntary associations, etc. (Hwang and Kim, 2009; Abernethy, Kuang, and Qin, 
2018). Specifically, we construct four social connection variables to capture the connectedness 
between a firm and brokerages that follow the firm, including the presence of such social 
connections, the types of social connections, the number of socially connected brokerage 
houses to the firm, and the aggregate number of social connections. We estimate a firm’s ex-
ante cost of equity using the average measure obtained from four widely applied implied-cost-
of-equity models (i.e., Claus and Thomas, 2001; Easton, 2004; Gebhardt, Lee, and 
Swaminathan, 2001; Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth, 2005).  
We find that the social connection variables are significantly and negatively related to 
firms’ cost of equity. The uncovered negative relations are robust to controlling for industry 
and year fixed effects and a host of firm characteristics including firm size, market-to-book 
equity ratio, leverage, profitability, investment, stock beta, past stock returns, and importantly, 
analyst coverage, and analyst earnings forecast dispersion. Moreover, we examine the plausible 
impact of within-firm variation in the association and find that the negative relation between 
                                                          
explicitly pay for,” and that many brokerage firms ask their analysts to just drop coverage instead of putting out 
sell ratings.. 
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social connections and cost of equity continues to hold after we control for firm fixed effects, 
suggesting that time-invariant unobservable firm heterogeneity is not an endogeneity concern.  
The social network literature argues that not all social ties are the same and they might 
be formed in different situations (Hwang and Kim, 2009; Bruynseels and Cardinaels, 2014). 
We next explore whether various types of firm-brokerage social connections affect cost of 
equity differently. We find that connections derived from non-employment social activities 
have the largest effect in reducing the firm’s cost of equity, followed by employment-based 
connections. In addition, we do not find school ties to significantly affect the firm’s cost of 
equity, in line with prior literature (Cohen, Frazzini and Malloy, 2010). Overall, our findings 
suggest that firms benefit from being socially connected with Wall Street (i.e., through 
employment ties and other social activities), as reflected in reduced cost of equity.  
To corroborate our conjecture that firm-brokerage social connections facilitate 
information transmission from firms to capital markets and thus reduce cost of equity, we 
investigate settings in which we expect the effects of firm-brokerage social connections on 
firms’ cost of equity to vary. We find the effect of social connections in reducing firms’ cost 
of equity to be greater when a firm possesses more proprietary and hard-to-verify soft 
information relating to research and developments, mergers and acquisitions, product market 
competition, and external equity raising. We further find the effect to be more pronounced for 
firms operating in more opaque information environments, firms facing tighter financial 
constraints, and firms that are subject to weaker external and internal corporate governance. 
These results indicate that firm-brokerage social connections are more useful when there is a 
greater need of disseminating value-relevant information from firms to capital markets. 
We are aware that the uncovered effect of firm-brokerage social connections on firms’ 
cost of equity is subject to potential endogeneity concerns. For example, analysts may prefer 
to establish social connections with firms that have lower cost of equity (such firms are 
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typically larger, more transparent, and better governed). That is, it can be lower cost of equity 
that leads to better social connections with analysts, rather than the other way around as 
conjectured. Moreover, an omitted-variable concern is also relevant as unobserved (and thus 
uncontrolled) firm-specific, time-varying omitted variables may drive both social connections 
and cost of equity, rendering the documented relations spurious. We use two types of quasi-
natural experiments to address these concerns.  
The first type of quasi-natural experiments we use is exogenous brokerage closures or 
mergers (Kelly and Ljungqvist, 2012; Derrien and Kecskes, 2013; Irani and Oesch, 2013; Chen, 
Harford and Lin, 2015). Closure of a connected brokerage represents a negative exogenous 
shock to the firm’s social connections with brokerage houses; so does a takeover of a connected 
brokerage by another brokerage house due to the restructuring and laying off subsequent to the 
takeover.9 The second type of quasi-natural experiments involves exogenous CEO turnover 
(Eisfeldt and Kuhnen, 2013) where the replacement CEO is promoted from the same firm. In 
those cases, the CEO turnover is related to factors such as planned retirement, health issue or 
sudden death and thus is exogenous to firm performance. Further, the inside successor is likely 
to continue with the firm’s current strategy and corporate policies, thereby limitedly affecting 
the markets’ prospect on the firm (Gilson and Vetsuypens, 1993; Farrell and Whidbee, 2003; 
Clayton, Hartzell, and Rosenberg, 2005). The departure of the old CEO can lead to a reduction 
in social connections with brokerages, while the new CEO brings no new connections with the 
firm since she comes from the same firm. Thus, CEO departure with internal replacement 
represents a negative exogenous shock to firm-brokerage social connections.       
We first conduct a reduced-form estimation employing the stacking event-window cohort 
approach in a difference-in-differences (DiD) regression framework (e.g., Gormley and Matsa, 
                                                          
9 We control for the number of analysts following in the analyses as brokerage closure or merger also negatively 
affects the number of analysts following the firm. Note that the second type of quasi-natural experiments we use—
exogenous CEO turnover—does not affect the number of analysts following. 
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2011) for each type of quasi-natural experiments. We find that relative to control firms, 
treatment firms on average experience a significant increase in cost of equity by around 1.5 
percentage points after the exogenous CEO turnovers and more than 1 percentage points after 
the exogenous brokerage exits. We then conduct two-stage least square (2SLS) instrumental-
variable regressions. We use the DiD term (i.e., Treat*Post) from the aforementioned reduced-
form analyses as the instrument to extract the exogenous component of social connections and 
then relate the extracted exogenous component to cost of equity. We find that in the first stage 
of the 2SLS regressions, social connections are significantly and negatively related to the DiD 
term, which validates that exogenous CEO turnover or brokerage exit is indeed an exogenous 
negative shock to firm-brokerage social connections. In the second stage, the extracted 
exogenous component of social connections is significantly and negatively related to cost of 
equity. A one-standard-deviation increase in our instrumented social connection variables is on 
average related to a decrease in cost of equity by 0.6 to 0.9 percentage point in the first setting 
(brokerage exit) and 0.6 to 0.7 percentage point in the second experimental setting (exogenous 
CEO turnover). Thus, the reduction effect of firm-brokerage social connections on the firms’ 
cost of equity is likely causal. 
Our cost of equity measure in the main tests is estimated using consensus analyst earnings 
forecasts.10 As a first robustness check, we follow Hou, van Dijk and Zhang (2012) and Li and 
Mohanram (2014) and run cross-sectional regressions using lagged information to estimate 
future earnings for horizons of 1 to 5 years. We then use the earnings forecasts from these 
cross-sectional regression models to replace analysts’ forecasts and estimate the implied cost 
of equity. Second, we estimate cost of equity using Fama and French’s (1993) three-factor 
model. Third, we repeat our main regressions after dropping those firms with analysts’ forecast 
                                                          
10 Analysts’ earnings forecasts may contain optimistic bias. Such optimistic bias, however, makes us more difficult 
to find a significant effect of social connections in reducing cost of equity as it will upwardly bias the implied cost 
of equity estimate, which is the discount rate that equates the firm’s stock price to the present value of its expected 
future cash flows.   
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biases being in the top 30% of the sample. Our results are robust to using all of these alternative 
measures of cost of equity. Finally, we find that social connections with brokerage houses are 
significantly and positively related to firms’ equity valuation (proxied by market-to-book 
equity ratio), which corroborates the uncovered reduction effect of such social connections on 
firms’ cost of equity.     
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, it contributes to the 
burgeoning literature on how corporate executives and directors’ social connections shape a 
firm’s financial policies and performance outcomes. Prior literature documents mixed results 
on the effects of social connections. Some studies find that firms with well-connected boards 
experience higher future stock returns and firm performance, and firms with well-connected 
CEOs invest more in innovations and receive more and higher-quality patents (Larcker, So and 
Wang, 2013; Faleye, Kovacs and Venkateswaran, 2014). However, social connections can be 
detrimental to firm value. For example, CEO-director social connections are found to be 
associated with CEO entrenchment, suboptimal compensation contracts, and low turnover-to-
performance sensitivity (Hwang and Kim, 2009; Kramarz and Thesmar, 2013). Well-
connected CEOs who are self-interested engage in value-destroying acquisitions (Fracassi and 
Tate, 2012; El-Khatib, Fogel and Jandik, 2015).11 We contribute to this growing literature by 
documenting the first evidence that a firm’s social connections with Wall Street brokerage 
houses benefit the firm by reducing its cost of equity.  
Second, extant studies on firms’ social connections with brokerage analysts focus on how 
such connections improve brokerage analysts’ decision outputs and career outcomes (e.g., 
Cohen, Frazzini and Malloy, 2010; Fang and Huang, 2017). Our study complements these 
studies by documenting evidence on how firms benefit from social connections with 
                                                          
11 Relatedly, Ishii and Xuan (2014) show that social connections between acquirers and targets lead to poor M&A 
outcomes for shareholders but benefit corporate executives.  
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brokerages, directly speaking to why firms have economic incentives to establish and maintain 
social connections with brokerage firms. Further, our empirical evidence suggests that 
investors also appreciate the establishment of firm-brokerage social connections by charging 
lower risk premium.  
Finally, our study also contributes to the vast literature on cost of equity. Prior literature 
has demonstrated a range of determinants of cost of equity such as firm risk (e.g., Pastor, Sinha, 
and Swaminathan, 2008; Lee, Ng, and Swaminathan, 2009; Chava and Purnanandam, 2010), 
disclosures (e.g., Botosan, 1997; Francis, Khurana, and Pereira, 2005), earnings attributes (e.g., 
Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper, 2004), taxes (e.g., Dhaliwal, Heitzman, and Li, 2006), 
legal institutions and securities regulation  (e.g., Hail and Leuz, 2006),  cross-listings (e.g., Hail 
and Leuz, 2009), legal protection, corporate governance and shareholder rights (e.g., Chen, 
Chen, and Wei, 2009, 2011), operating inflexibility (e.g., Chen, Kacperczyk, and Ortiz-Molina, 
2011), diversification (e.g., Hann, Ogneva and Ozbas, 2013) and asset illiquidity (e.g., Ortiz-
Molina and Phillips, 2014). We add to the literature by showing that a firm’s social connections 
with brokerage houses are an important driver of the firm’s cost of equity.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data and presents 
sample descriptive statistics. Section 3 documents the relation between firms’ social 
connections with analysts and cost of equity. Section 4 addresses endogeneity concerns using 
two types of quasi-natural experiments. Section 5 presents the robustness results. Section 6 
concludes. The Appendix provides a variable definition table and additional empirical results. 
 
2.  Empirical Methodology 
2.1. Data Sources and Sample Selection 
We follow the literature and compile the social connection information from the BoardEx 
database (e.g., Engelberg, Gao, and Parsons, 2012; Fracassi and Tate, 2012; Bruynseels and 
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Cardinaels, 2014). In particular, we obtained BoardEx Core Reports and started our initial 
sample with brokerage houses that are covered by BoardEx in its private firm section. To 
identify those brokerage houses, we developed an algorithm and matched firms in BoardEx 
with a list of brokerage houses by broker names.12 In this way, we identified twenty-three 
brokerage houses that are included in the BoardEx database and have at least one social 
connection to the covered firms. These brokerage houses followed 2,160 firms, result in 12,036 
firm-years observations.  
We then obtained financial data from Compustat, stock returns from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP), and analyst forecasts from Institutional Brokers’ Estimate 
System (I/B/E/S). We further impose a constraint that firms included in our sample need to 
have at least one social connection to the brokerage industry over our entire sample period, 
even if the connected brokerage houses do not follow the firm. This sample selection constraint 
is to help address the concern that firms that share no connection with brokerage industry at all 
might be fundamentally different from those that are connected. That is, we impose this 
constraint to help tackle the potential non-randomness in the social connectedness between a 
firm and the brokerage industry.13 After removing observations with missing values, our final 
sample consists of 7,291 firm-years from 1,343 firms. 
2.2. Variable Definitions 
2.2.1. Social Connection Measures 
 We consider a firm and a brokerage house to be socially connected if directors and 
executives in the firm share at least one social tie with an employee (including analysts, 
executives and directors) in the brokerage house via past employments, joined social activities 
                                                          
12 In case of multiple matches, a research assistant and a co-author independently cross-checked with other 
information of the firm, such as names of executives or directors, to ensure correct matches. 
13 In the robustness section, we show that the results are qualitatively similar if we lift this sample selection 
constraint.  
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such as shared memberships in voluntary associations, charity organizations and sports clubs, 
or alma mater based on data available on BoardEx 14 To ensure that individuals are genuinely 
linked, we require that they overlapped for at least one year when being employed by the same 
company. In case of social activities or educational experiences, we consider two individuals 
linked when they participated in the same activities or graduated from the same school.15 The 
status of social connectedness between a firm and analysts is estimated at the end of year t-1. 
We construct a set of variables to capture the incidence and strength of social connections 
between a firm and brokerage houses that follow the firm. Variable Connected? is an indicator 
for the existence of any types of social connections between a firm and at least one broker 
among those who follow the firm. Variable #Brokers_Connected counts the number of 
brokerage houses that follow the firm and are socially connected with the focal firm. The 
literature shows that different types of social ties (employment-based vs. friendship-based) 
might be used in different situations (Gibbons, 2004; Bruynseels and Cardinaels, 2014). We 
thus treat different types of social ties independently and construct two additional social-tie 
variables. Specifically, we follow the literature and categorize social ties into three groups 
based on the platforms where the connections are established: via employment history, social 
activities, or educational activities. Variable #Connection_Type counts the types of social ties 
a focal firm has with all brokers that follow the firm, with a highest possible value of three and 
a lowest of zero; variable #Connections instead counts the total number of social connections 
                                                          
14 We acknowledge the limitation of the social connection information in BoardEx as the database compiles the 
information from public sources (e.g., annual reports, social media, etc.) and senior management or directors in a 
brokerage house are more likely to be covered compared to individual analysts. However, evidence shows that in 
a brokerage house information is shared and diffused among colleagues and top-down (see footnote 4 for a 
discussion of the evidence). Our measures of social connections capture a relatively complete set of connections 
through which a firm is linked to brokerage houses.. 
15 We follow the literature and drop the requirement for overlapping time periods when estimating social ties via 
education and other social activities, because BoardEx often does not cover the start and end year of these activities 
(Bruynseels and Cardinaels, 2014; Abernethy, Kuang and Qin, 2018). Prior literature also shows that ties 
established via social activities tend to sustain over a long period of one’s life as they attract people with similar 
religion, belief, and status (Westphal and Khanna, 2003; McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook, 2001), which 
supports our choice in removing overlapping period constraint in defining social activity-related social ties. 
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between a focal firm and individual brokerage houses incorporating all the three types of social 
ties and the number of connected personnel between firms and brokerage houses. 
Using a hypothetical example, we demonstrate how the set of social-tie variables is 
defined. Assume that the executives and directors of Firm A are socially connected with three 
brokerage houses—Brokers aaa, bbb, and ccc, one social tie to each of Brokers aaa and bbb, 
and two social ties to Broker ccc. The connection to Broker aaa is established via past co-
working experiences and the same for the connection to Broker bbb. The two social ties to 
Broker ccc are through joint educational background and past co-working experiences, 
respectively. In this case, the variable of Connected? has a value of one and 
#Brokers_Connected equals three because three brokerage houses that follow the firm are 
socially connected with the firm; #Connection_Type equals two as the firm shares two types 
of social ties (employment and education) with the brokerage houses; moreover, #Connection 
counts the aggregate number of ties and thus has a value of four. 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in our main analysis. The 
mean of the indicator Connected? is 0.66, which suggests that about 66% of firm-year 
observations in our final sample have social connection(s) with brokerage houses that follow 
the firm. The means of #Connection_Type and #Brokers_Connected are both about one with 
the medians being one, suggesting that the connections are normally made through single 
channel, and a firm is generally connected with one brokerage house. Furthermore, the mean 
of the aggregate number of social connections (#Connections) is about two with the median 
being one in the sample. The sample standard deviations of the four social-tie variables (0.48, 
0.95, 1.01 and 1.77, respectively) are relatively large compared with their respective means 
and medians, suggesting large variations in these variables in the sample.     
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
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2.2.2. Cost of Equity Measures 
We measure the cost of equity in line with prior literature. Specifically, we estimate the 
ex-ante cost of equity implied in current stock prices and analyst forecasts. We estimate the 
cost of equity using four different models: the Claus and Thomas’s (2001) model, the Gebhardt, 
Lee and Swaminathan’s (2001) model, the Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth’s (2005) model, and 
the Easton’s (2004) model.16 We then compute the average cost of equity estimated by each 
model, R_avg, to proxy for the cost of equity. Table 1 shows that an average firm in our sample 
has a cost of equity of about 10% with the median being 9%, generally consistent with the 
results reported in the original studies (Claus and Thomas, 2001; Gebhardt, Lee, Swaminathan, 
2001; Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth, 2005; Easton, 2004).  
2.3. Model Specification 
 To test Hypothesis 1, we estimate the following OLS regression: 
Cost of Equityi,t = α + β1 Social Connectioni,t-1 + Controlsi,t-1 + εi,c,t                 (1) 
where Social Connectioni,t-1 stands for one of the four social-connection variables we use to 
capture social connections between a focal firm i and brokerage houses that follow the firm as 
measured at the end of year t-1. According to Hypothesis 1, we expect that a firm’s social 
connections with brokerage houses that cover the firm will significantly reduce its cost of 
equity. That is, we expect a significantly negative sign on β1 in Equation (1). 
We further include a battery of control variables following the prior literature (e.g., Hail 
and Leuz, 2006; Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan, 2001; Dhaliwal, Heitzman, and Li , 2006; 
Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok, and Mishra, 2011). The controls include Size, defined as the natural 
                                                          
16 Measuring cost of equity using ex-post realized stock returns is inaccurate (e.g., Elton, 1999; Fama and French, 
1997) because realized returns can be far off from expected returns. Thus, the literature advocates using an ex-
ante measure—implied cost of equity—to measure the firm’s cost of equity, which is the internal rate of return 
that makes the firm’s stock price equal to the present value of its expected future cash flows. The implied cost of 
equity measure has been widely applied in finance and accounting literatures (e.g., Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and 
Schipper, 2005, Dhaliwal, Heitzman, and Li, 2006, Hail and Leuz, 2006, 2009, Pastor, Sinha, and Swaminathan, 
2008, Lee, Ng, and Swaminathan, 2009, Chava and Purnanandam, 2010, Chen, Chen, and Wei, 2011, Ortiz-
Molina and Phillips, 2014, and many others). Nevertheless, our findings are robust to using alternative measures 
of cost of equity. 
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logarithm of total assets; Market-to-Book, which is the market-to-book equity ratio; Leverage, 
computed as the debt to asset ratio; Profitability, which is income before extraordinary items 
scaled by total assets ; Investment, which is the ratio of investment to total assets; Beta, which 
is the market beta of the firm’s stock; Past Stock Return, which is the buy-and-hold stock return 
of the firm over the financial year; Forecast Dispersion, computed as the monthly average of 
the inter-analyst standard deviation of analyst earnings forecasts scaled by absolute mean 
forecasts for the year; and Number of Analysts, which counts the number of analysts following 
the firm during the year. We further include industry and year fixed effects to control for 
industry-specific factors and macroeconomic factors. Standard errors are clustered at the firm 
level. The Appendix provides the definitions of all variables included in our analysis.  
 
3. Empirical Results 
3.1. Primary Analysis 
We estimate Equation (1) and the regression results are reported in Table 2. The 
coefficient on Connected? (β = -0.265) is significantly negative at the 1% level, suggesting that 
firms on average have lower cost of equity if their corporate executives and directors are 
socially connected with brokerage houses who follow the firms. The reduction effect of social 
connections on the cost of equity does not change when we measure firm-broker connections 
differently. The coefficients on #Brokers_Connected (β = -0.139) are significantly negative at 
the 1% level while the coefficients on #Connection_Type (β = -0.137) and #Connections (β = 
-0.070) are both significantly negative at the 5% level, indicating that a firm’s cost of equity is 
negatively related to the number of connected brokerage houses, the number of social 
connection types and the total number of social connections, respectively.17 The results of 
                                                          
17 We also use firm fixed-effects regressions to control for unobserved firm heterogeneity. We discuss these results 
in robustness tests.  
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control variables are generally consistent with the prior literature (e.g., Ghoul, Guedhami, 
Kwok, and Mishra, 2011; Ortiz-Molina and Phillips, 2014; Goh, Lee, Lim, and Shevlin, 2016).  
We find that Market-to-Book, Profitability and Number of Analysts are all negatively related 
to firm’s cost of equity, while Leverage, Beta and Forecast Dispersion increase cost of equity. 
In summary, the results are consistent with our conjecture that firm-brokerage social 
connections decrease the firm’s cost of equity.  
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
3.2. Types of Social Connections 
In this section, we distinguish between different types of firm-brokerage social 
connections (i.e., employment, education, and social activity) and re-estimate Equation (1) for 
each type of connections. Table 3 summarizes the results.  
We find that firm-broker connections derived from social activity have the largest effect 
on the firm’s cost of equity (β = -0.250, t = -2.60), followed by connections based on past co-
working history (β = -0.167, t = -1.78). Connections established via mutual educational 
background have insignificant effects on the firm’s cost of equity. This finding is consistent 
with Cohen, Frazzini and Malloy (2010), who find no return premium of the stocks 
recommended by analysts who share school ties with covered firms in the post-Reg-FD period. 
Taken together, our results indicate that the effect of firm-brokerage social connections on 
firms’ cost of equity is primarily driven by past employment and social activity connections.  
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
3.3. Cross-Sectional Analysis 
To add more credence to our argument that a firm’s social connections with analysts 
reduce its cost of equity through decreasing information asymmetry, we next explore settings 
in which the relation between firm-brokerage social connections and firms’ cost of equity is 
likely to vary.  
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3.3.1. Soft Information  
When a firm’s value-relevant information is mostly soft in nature that requires a greater 
extent of verification and interpretation, connected brokerages are likely to play a larger role. 
Connected brokerages are more likely to have direct access to corporate executives and 
directors and thus are better able to verify and interpret soft information such as those related 
to research and development programs, mergers and acuiqsitions, product market competition, 
and external equity raising. Analysts of connected brokerages can then convey the correct 
content of such soft information in their earnings forecasts and/or research reports, thereby 
reducing information asymmetry regarding the value of the firm.18 Thus, we expect the effect 
of firm-brokerage social connections on a firm’ cost of equity to be greater when a considerable 
amount of soft information is related to the firm’s business activities.  
We use research and development (R&D), mergers and acuiqsitions (MA_Value), 
product market competition (Fluidity), 19  and external equity raising (Equity_Raising) to 
capture different types of business activities that give rise mostly to soft information. We add 
R&D,  MA_Value, Fluidity, and Equity_Raising and their interactions with our social 
connection measures to Equation (1). Table 4 reports the findings. Component terms and 
control variables are included in the regressions but are omitted from reporting for brevity. 
The coefficients on the interaction terms are negative across all models and statistically 
significant in most of the models (except for the cases where social connections interact with 
fluidity). This finding is consistent with the conjecture that firm-brokerage social connections 
help reduce the firm’s cost of equity particularly when the firm has a large amount of soft 
information that is hard to verify and interpret.  
                                                          
18 Asquith, Mikhail and Au (2005) investigate the information content of analysts’ reports and demonstrate that 
analysts typically comment on various firms’ decisions relating to cost efficiencies, business strategies, and 
mergers and acquisitions activities to justify their earnings forecasts, price targets and stock recommendations. 
19 The data is available at http://hobergphillips.tuck.dartmouth.edu/. We thank Gerard Hoberg and Gordon Phillips 
for generously providing the data on their research website.  
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[Insert Table 4 around here] 
3.3.2. Information Environment  
We next examine the relation between firm-brokerage social connections and a firm’s 
cost of equity conditional on the firm’s information environment. If the reduced cost of equity 
is attributable to the fact that firm-brokerage social connections mitigate information 
asymmetry on firm value, we expect that the marginal effect of social connections on cost of 
equity should be more pronounced for firms with opaque information environments than firms 
with transparent information environments.  
Following the prior literature, we use four measures to capture the opaqueness of a 
firm’s information environment: firm size, idiosyncratic volatility, analyst earnings forecast 
dispersion, and probability of informed trading (Barron and Stuerke, 1998; Easley, Hvidkjaer, 
and O’Hara, 2002; Fang and Peress, 2009). While firm size is negatively correlated with the 
opaqueness of firm’s information environment, the latter three have a positive association with 
the opaqueness of a firm’s information environment. We split our sample into two groups each 
year based on the sample median, and construct an indicator variable for each measure. 
Small_Size equals one if the firm’s size is below the sample median of the year and equals zero 
otherwise. High_IV, High_Dispersion or High_PIN equals one if the firm’s idiosyncratic 
volatility, analyst earnings forecast dispersion, or probability of informed trading is above the 
respective sample median of the year, respectively, and equals zero otherwise. These indicators 
are proxies for an opaque information environment. We then add Small_Size, High_IV, 
High_Dispersion and High_Pin and their interactions with our social connection measures to 
Equation (1). Table 5 summarizes the findings.  
The coefficients on the interaction terms are significantly negative in all models except 
for the cases where #Connection_Type interacts with High_Dispersion or High_PIN. The 
results indicate that the negative effect of firm-brokerage social connections on the firm’s cost 
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of equity is more salient when the firm’s information environment is more opaque and thus the 
firm is subject to greater information asymmetry.  
[Insert Table 5 around here] 
3.3.3. Financial Constraints 
We then examine how the relation between the firm’s social connections with 
brokerage houses and its cost of equity varies with financial constraints of the firm. Prior 
research shows that firms with high information asymmetry have increased financial 
constraints (e.g., Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Myers and Majluf, 1984). The more severe the 
information asymmetry, the more likely that external finance will be either costly or 
unavailable (Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen, 1988). We thus expect the impact of firm-
brokerage social connections on cost of equity to be stronger for financially constrained firms 
than for unconstrained firms. 
We follow the literature and use the Kaplan and Zingales Index (Lamont, Polk and Saa-
Requejo, 2001), the Whited and Wu Index (Whited and Wu, 2006), and the Hadlock and Pierce 
Index (Hadlock and Pierce, 2010) as proxies for financial constraints. The higher value of these 
index-based measures, the more financial constrained the firms are facing. As financially 
constrained firms generally pay less or no dividends (Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen, 1998), 
we also classify non-dividend-paying firms as constrained firms. For each index measure, we 
split our sample into groups based on the respective sample median of each year, and construct 
one indicator variable for each measure—High_WW, High_HP or High_KZ equals one if the 
index-based financial constraint measure is above the respective sample median of the year and 
equals zero otherwise. We create an indicator variable, Non_Dividend_Payer, that equals one 
if a firm pays no dividend at the end of the fiscal year and equals zero otherwise. We then add 
High_WW, High_HP, High_KZ and Non_Dividend_Payer and their interaction terms with our 
social connection measures to Equation (1).  
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As shown in Table 6, the coefficients on the interaction terms are negative and 
statistically significant in most models (except for the interactions of #Connection_Type with 
High_HP, and Connected? with Dividend_Payer) when we measure financial constraints using 
Whited-Wu and Hadlock-Pierce indices and non-dividend-payer. We do not find significant 
results when we use the Kaplan-Zingales index as the proxy for financial constraints, likely 
because this index is not the best proxy for financial constraints (e.g., see Hadlock and Pierce, 
2010, and Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist, 2015). The results in Table 6 suggest that the effect of 
firm-brokerage social connections in reducing cost of equity is stronger for firms with tighter 
financial constraints. Again, the findings are consistent with the conjecture that firm-brokerage 
social connections are more important when a firm’s information asymmetry is high.  
[Insert Table 6 around here] 
3.3.4. Corporate Governance 
Finally, we examine the effect of firm-brokerage social connections on cost of equity 
conditional on firms’ corporate governance. A general consensus in the literature suggests that 
firms with weaker corporate governance is associated with greater information asymmetry 
because of high monitoring costs (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; 
Almazan and Suarez, 2003; Raheja, 2005; Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Harris and Raviv, 2008; 
Duchin, Matsusaka, and Ozbas, 2010). Thus, there is a greater need for analysts from connected 
brokerage houses to acquire and ascertain information for these firms and to disseminate the 
information to the capital market. We hence expect that the marginal effect of firm-brokerage 
social connections in decreasing the firm’s information asymmetry and its cost of equity is 
higher when the firm’s corporate governance is weaker. 
We follow the prior literature and create a set of governance indicator variables that 
equal one if the connected firm is associated with weaker external governance proxied by low 
takeover threats and low institutional ownership (Chung and Zhang, 2011; Cain, McKeon and 
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Solomon, 2017), and weaker internal governance proxied by low board independence and low 
CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity (Hwang and Kim 2009). For each measure, we split our 
sample into groups based on the respective sample median of each year. Low_Takeover_Treat, 
Low_IO, Low_Independence, or Low_CEO_PPS equals one if the takeover threats, 
institutional ownership, board independence or CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity is below 
the respective sample median of the year and equals zero otherwise. We then add 
Low_Takeover_Treat, Low_IO, Low_Independence, or Low_CEO_PPS and their interaction 
terms with our social connection measures to Equation (1). The results are reported in Table 7.  
The coefficients on the interaction terms between the social connection variables and 
the proxies for weak corporate governance are negative across all models of Table 7. Moreover, 
the interaction terms are statistically significant in all models when weak corporate governance 
is proxied by low board independence, low institutional ownership and low CEO pay-for-
performance sensitivity. When the hostile takeover index (Cain, McKeon and Solomon, 2017) 
is used to proxy for weak governance, the coefficients on the interaction terms, 
Low_Takeover_Treats×#Broker_Connected and Low_Takeover_Treats×#Connections, are 
also both significantly negative. These results indicate that the effects of firms’ social 
connections on cost of equity are stronger for firms with weaker corporate governance, 
consistent with our expectation that firm-brokerage social connections are more important in a 
situation where disseminating information to the capital market is most needed. 
[Insert Table 7 around here] 
In summary, consistent with the conjecture that firm-brokerage social connections 
decrease firms’ cost of equity through enhancing information propagation from firms to the 
capital markets and reducing information asymmetry, we find that the effect of firm-brokerage 
social connections on cost of equity is more pronounced in firms with hard-to-interpret soft 
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information, opaque information environments, tight financial constraints and/or weak 
corporate governance.  
 
4. Addressing Endogeneity Concerns 
4.1. Quasi-natural Experiments 
Our findings are potentially subject to endogeneity concerns. Specifically, there is a 
reverse causality concern—brokerage firms may prefer to establish social connections with 
firms that have lower cost of equity. That is, it can be lower cost of equity that leads to better 
social connections with analysts, rather than the other way around. Moreover, an omitted-
variable concern is also relevant in our setting as unobserved firm-specific, time-varying 
omitted variables may drive both social connections and cost of equity, rendering the 
documented relations spurious.  
To address endogeneity concerns in our setting, our identification strategy exploits two 
types of quasi-natural experiments that create potential exogenous variation in firm-brokerage 
social connections. The first type of quasi-natural experiments is exogenous brokerage closures 
or mergers (Kelly and Ljungqvist, 2012; Derrien and Kecskes, 2013; Irani and Oesch, 2013; 
Chen, Harford and Lin, 2015). Brokerage closures or mergers are mostly triggered by business 
strategy considerations in the wake of significant changes to the economics of producing equity 
research (Kelly and Ljungqvist, 2012). As a result, the exit of a connected brokerage due to 
closure or merger is a negative exogenous shock to the firm’s social connections with 
brokerage houses (i.e., it exogenously reduces the number of social connections with 
brokerages), uncorrelated with firm-specific characteristics. Out of the twenty-three brokerage 
houses included in our sample, we identified one brokerage merger (Bear Stearns) and one 
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brokerage closure (Gleacher & Co) during our sample period. We then select firms covered by 
these exiting brokerages in year t-1 as treatment firms.20  
The second type of quasi-natural experiments we use is exogenous CEO turnover with 
replacement CEO coming from within the firm (Eisfeldt and Kuhnen, 2013). In those CEO 
turnover cases, the departure of CEO is due to factors such as planned retirement, health issue 
or sudden death, and is not related to firm performance. We argue that exogenous CEO 
departures with internal replacements represent negative exogenous shocks to the firm’s social 
connections with brokerages but not to its corporate strategy and policies as inside successors 
are likely to continue with the firm’s current strategy and corporate policies (e.g., Gilson and 
Vetsuypens, 1993; Farrell and Whidbee, 2003; Clayton, Hartzell, and Rosenberg, 2005). We 
obtain CEO turnover data from Eisfeldt and Kuhnen (2013), which records CEO departures 
and their reasons from 1992 to 2006.21 During our sample period, we identify 36 socially 
connected firms that experienced exogenous CEO departures with replacements coming from 
within the firm. These firms are the treatment firms in our sample. 
4.2. Difference-in-differences Regressions 
We first conduct a reduced-form estimation employing the stacking event-window cohort 
approach in a difference-in-differences regression framework (e.g., Gormley and Matsa, 2011) 
for each type of quasi-natural experiments.22 In each setting, we compare the changes in cost 
of equity of the treatment firms, who experienced either connected brokerage exits or 
exogenous CEO departure, and the changes in cost of equity of the control firms. Control firms 
are firms in the same industry and with the same quintile of firm size as the treatment firms but 
                                                          
20 In the analysis of brokerage exits, we drop firms that experienced both connected brokerage exits to avoid 
confounding effects. 
21 The data is available at https://sites.google.com/site/andrealeisfeldt/. We thank Andrea Eisfeldt for generously 
providing the data on her research website.  
22 The results in Table 9 below validate that both types of quasi-natural experiments indeed cause significant 
exogenous reduction in firm-analyst social connections in the treatment firms compared with size- and industry-
matched control firms.  
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experiencing no connected brokerage exit (for the first experimental setting) or CEO turnover 
(for the first experimental setting). Following Chen, Harford and Lin (2015), for each event, 
we construct a cohort of treatment and control firms using firm-year observations of one year 
before and one year after the event to ensure that we capture only the direct effects of the 
exogenous drop in firm-brokerage social connections. For each type of experiments, we then 
pool the data across cohorts and estimate the average treatment effect, using the following 
difference-in-differences regression specification: 
Cost of Equityi,c,t = α + β1 Treati,c × Postc,t-1 + Controlsi,c,t-1 + γc,i + ωc,t + εi,c,t              (2) 
where Treati,c equals 1 for the treatment firms in cohort c and equals 0 otherwise. Postc,t-1 equals 
1 for cohort c and year t-1 if the year is after the event and equals 0 otherwise. We include firm-
cohort fixed effects, γc,i, to control for any time-invariant differences between treatment firms 
and control firms in different cohorts. Year-cohort fixed effects, ωc,t, are added to control for 
any common shocks to treatment and control firms in different cohorts. The coefficient β1 on 
the interaction term, Treati,c×Postc,t-1, in Equation (2) captures the average treatment effect of 
the exogenous shocks to firm-brokerage social connections on cost of equity. Robust standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level.  
Gormley and Matsa (2011) raise the concern on endogenous control variables in the 
difference-in-differences framework. Exogenous shocks (in our case, exogenous CEO turnover 
or brokerage exits) may affect some time-varying firm-level variables. Therefore, including 
these variables may bias the estimates of β1. However, if these control variables are not affected 
by the quasi-natural experiments, including them will help soak up the variations in the 
regression residuals and improve our estimation precision. We thus present the difference-in-
differences regression results, both with and without time-varying firm-level control variables, 
in Table 8.  
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Columns 3 and 7 present the difference-in-differences regression results without time-
varying firm-level accounting variables. We find that relative to the control firms, the treatment 
firms on average experienced a significant increase in cost of equity by more than 1 percentage 
points after the exogenous brokerage exits and around 1.5 percentage points after the 
exogenous CEO turnovers. The results are qualitatively similar when we control for time-
varying firm-level control variables (Columns 4 and 8). Thus, these reduced-form estimation 
results clearly indicate that the exogenous negative shocks to firm-brokerage social connections 
caused an increase in the treatment firms’ cost of equity relative to the control firms.  
We further conduct placebo experiments by falsely assuming that the CEO turnover or 
brokerage exit occurs three years or two years before it actually does. We then re-estimate the 
difference-in-differences regression models. Columns 1, 2, 5, and 6 show that the coefficients 
of Treati,c×Postc,t-1 are close to zero and statistically insignificant in these placebo regressions, 
suggesting that the uncovered treatment effect is unlikely driven by nonparallel trends in cost 
of equity in the treatment and control groups before the onset of treatment.   
[Insert Table 8 around here] 
4.3. 2SLS Instrumental-Variable Regressions  
We next address the endogeneity concerns by conducting two-stage least square (2SLS) 
instrumental-variable regressions. We use the DiD term (i.e., Treat×Post) from the earlier 
reduced-form analyses as the instrument, to extract the exogenous component of social 
connections and then relate the extracted exogenous component to cost of equity. As we use 
brokerage exits that are exogenous to treatment firms and use CEO departure events that are 
not caused by firm-specific reasons and, our instrumental variable satisfies the exclusion 
restriction.  
Panel A and Panel B of Table 9 report the 2SLS regression results for brokerage exits 
and exogenous CEO turnover, respectively. Columns (1) to (4) of Panels A and B present the 
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first-stage regression results, where we regress each of the social-tie variables on the 
instrumental variable (Treat*Post), a set of controls, as well as firm-cohort and year-cohort 
fixed effects. The p-values of Cragg-Donald F-statistics strongly reject the null hypothesis of 
weak instrument at the 1% level.  
The first-stage regression results in Panel A show that after the brokerage exits, the 
treatment firms experienced significant reductions in firm-brokerage social connections across 
all four social-tie variables. The first-stage regression results in Panel B show that 
#Connection_Type, #Brokers_Connected and #Connections of the treatment firms declined 
significantly after the CEO departure shocks, but not the Connected? indicator. This is likely 
because Connected? is an indicator that reflects whether a firm is socially connected with 
brokerages, a weaker measure relative to the other three. Following exogenous CEO turnover, 
the treatment firms experienced reductions in the number of connections, but these firms may 
still stay connected with brokerages as they have other connections. As a result, we do not find 
a significant decrease in the Connected? indicator. Thus, the first-stage regression results 
clearly show that the treatment firms that experienced connected brokerage exits or exogenous 
CEO turnover indeed suffered significant reductions in their social connections with brokerage 
houses, compared with the control firms, validating that brokerage exit or exogenous CEO 
turnover indeed imposed an exogenous negative shock to firm-brokerage social connections.  
Columns (5) to (8) of Panels A and B present the second-stage regression results, where 
we regress cost of equity on the fitted values of social-tie variables and the same set of controls 
used in the first stage. The extracted exogenous components of social connections are 
significantly and negatively related to cost of equity. A one-standard-deviation increase in our 
instrumented social-tie variables is on average related to a decrease in cost of equity by 0.6 to 
0.9 percentage point in the first setting (exogenous brokerage exits) and 0.6 to 0.7 percentage 
point in the second experimental setting (exogenous CEO turnover). Thus, the negative impact 
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of social connections with analysts on firm’s cost of equity is likely causal and economically 
significant. 
[Insert Table 9 around here] 
 
5. Robustness Checks 
In this section, we conduct multiple robustness checks. First, we re-estimate Equation 
(1) using the same battery of control variables, year fixed-effects and firm fixed-effects, instead 
of industry fixed-effects. That is, we focus on the impact of within-firm variation in social 
connections over time on cost of equity (Wooldridge, 2012). As reported in Table 10, all the 
social-tie variables remain significant and negative.  
[Insert Table 10 around here] 
Second, brokerage analysts may generate favorable earnings forecasts for firms with 
which they are socially connected. However, as discussed earlier, such favorable earnings 
forecasts will bias against us finding a negative relation between social connections and cost 
of equity (since the implied cost of equity of connected firms will be overestimated). 
Nevertheless, to test the robustness of our inferences, we re-estimate Equation (1) using the 
implied cost of equity models that are not relied on analyst earnings forecasts. We follow Hou, 
Van Dijk and Zhang (2012) and Li and Mohanram (2014), and estimate cross-sectional models 
using past accounting variables to estimate future earnings for horizons of 1 to 5 years. We 
then reestimate the implied cost of equity using the earnings forecasts generated from the 
Residual Income (RI) models specified in Li and Mohanram (2014) and from the Hou, van 
Dijk and Zhang’s (2012) (HVZ) model, as a replacement for analyst earnings forecasts. We 
obtain very similar inferences from the regressions using these new cost of equity estimates as 
the dependent variables. These results are presented in Panels A and B of Table 11.  
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Moreover, we use an alternative model to estimate the firm’s cost of equity. 
Specifically, we run rolling time-series regressions using monthly data from year t − 4 to t to 
estimate the Fama and French’s (1993) three-factor loadings of a firm’s stock. We then use the 
estimated factor loadings and the average factor returns from 1926 to 2016 to estimate the 
firm’s cost of equity. Our inferences remain unchanged using this alternative cost-of-equity 
measure (Panel C of Table 11). To further address the issue of analyst forecast biases, we repeat 
our main regressions after dropping those firms whose forecast biases are in the top 30% of the 
sample. Again, the results remain qualitatively unchanged (Panel D of Table 11).  
[Insert Table 11 around here] 
Moreover, as mentioned earlier, we impose a sample-selection constraint that firms 
included in our sample need to have at least one social connection to the brokerage industry 
over our entire sample period. As a robustness check, we remove this constraint and replicate 
our baseline regressions in a broad Compustat/CRSP/IBES merged sample of 31,024 firm-year 
observations over our sample period.23 The results are reported in Table A2 in the Appendix. 
All four social-connection measures are negatively and highly significantly related to future 
cost of equity at the 1% level.            
Finally, if social connections with analysts help bring down firms’ cost of equity, all 
else equal (e.g., holding constant the expected future cash flows) we should find higher equity 
valuation for connected firms. This is because a lower discount rate (lower cost of equity) will 
lead to higher equity valuation. We thus re-estimate Equation (1) using market-to-book equity 
ratio instead of cost of equity as the dependent variable. Table A3 in the Appendix show that 
all four social-connection measures are significantly and positively associated with firms’ 
                                                          
23 We merge this broad sample with our social-connection sample and replace missing values of the social-tie 
variables with zero. 
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equity valuation at the 1% level. These results further corroborate the uncovered effect of firm-
brokerage social connections in reducing the firm’s cost of equity.   
   
6. Conclusion  
In this paper, we investigate whether social connections of a firm’s executives and 
directors with brokerage houses that follow the firm will affect the firm’s cost of equity. We 
conjecture that firm-brokerage social connections may reduce the firm’s cost of equity because 
the firm disseminates value-relevant information to capital markets through connected 
brokerage houses, resulting in reduced information asymmetry on the firm’s fundamental 
value. Using a sample of 7,291 U.S. firm-year observations during the 2001-2016 period, we 
find that firm-brokerage social connections significantly decrease the firm’s cost of equity. 
This reduction effect is primarily driven by social connections established via past employment 
and joint non-employment social activities, but not via mutual educational background.  
We further demonstrate that the effect is more pronounced for firms with more hard-
to-verify soft information, opaque information environments, greater financial constraints, or 
weaker corporate governance. We use two quasi-natural experiments—exogenous brokerage 
exits and CEO turnover with internal replacements—to address potential endogeneity 
concerns. Our results from difference-in-differences and instrumental-variable regression 
analyses suggest that the effect of firm-brokerage social connections on the firm’s cost of 
equity is likely causal. Our results are robust to alternative measures of cost of equity. Further, 
consistent with the evidence on cost of equity, we find that firm-brokerage social connections 
improve the firm’s equity valuation. 
Our findings may be of interests to academics, practitioners, and regulators. We provide 
initial evidence on how firms can benefit from building and maintaining social connections to 
brokerage houses, which contributes to the growing literature on social network. Our results 
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also indicate that firm-brokerage social connections are another important determinant of a 
firm’s cost of equity, adding to the vast literature on cost of equity. Finally, our results provide 
policy insights to regulators, particularly in the post-Reg FD era. Private information that flows 
from firms to connected brokerage firms may be beneficial to firms and their shareholders as 
long as such information is properly disseminated to capital markets. If such private 
information flow is prohibited, the firm’s cost of equity is likely to increase.  
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
This table reports the summary statistics. The sample consists of 7,291 firm-year observations from 
2001 to 2016. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Detailed 
descriptions of variables are provided in Table A1 in the Appendix.  
 
Variable Obs Mean P25 Median P75 Std. Dev. 
Cost of Equity (%) 7291 10.090 8.124 9.398 11.163 3.125 
Connected? 7291 0.656 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.475 
#Connection_Type 7291 1.122 0.000 1.000 2.000 0.948 
#Brokers_Connected 7291 1.064 0.000 1.000 2.000 1.014 
#Connections 7291 1.675 0.000 1.000 3.000 1.765 
Size 7291 7.878 6.621 7.838 9.023 1.675 
Market-to-Book 7291 3.588 1.702 2.713 4.318 4.701 
Leverage 7291 0.214 0.028 0.195 0.331 0.189 
Profitability 7291 0.052 0.025 0.058 0.097 0.096 
Investment 7291 0.163 0.006 0.080 0.192 0.368 
Beta 7291 1.125 0.807 1.073 1.385 0.470 
Past Return (%) 7291 18.090 -10.306 12.028 36.722 48.906 
Forecast Dispersion 7291 0.201 0.023 0.048 0.121 0.618 
Analyst Following 7291 12.205 6.000 11.000 17.000 7.607 
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Table 2. The Effect of Firm-brokerage social connections on Firms’ Cost of Equity 
This table reports the relation between firms’ social connections with analysts and firms’ cost of equity 
capital where social connections are measured using an indicator variable capturing whether a firm is 
socially connected with analysts (Connected?) in Column (1), the number of social connection types 
(#Connection_Type) in Column (2), the number of connected brokerage houses (#Brokers_Connected 
) in Column (3), and the total number of social connections (#Connections) in Column (4). All standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level. t-statistics are in parentheses. ∗ indicates significance at the 10% 
level; ∗∗ significance at 5%; ∗∗∗ significance at 1%. Variable definitions are provided in Table A1 in 
the Appendix. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Connected?t-1 -0.265***                   
 (-2.61)                   
#Connection_Type t-1  -0.137**                  
  (-2.49)                  
#Brokers_Connected t-1   -0.139***                 
   (-3.05)                 
#Connections t-1    -0.070**  
    (-2.56)    
Size t-1 -0.011 -0.002 -0.007 -0.005    
 (-0.23) (-0.05) (-0.14) (-0.10)    
Market-to-Book t-1 -0.069*** -0.068*** -0.069*** -0.069*** 
 (-6.12) (-6.07) (-6.08) (-6.05)    
Leverage t-1 2.711*** 2.698*** 2.690*** 2.683*** 
 (8.00) (7.96) (7.93) (7.90)    
Profitability t-1 -3.847*** -3.859*** -3.875*** -3.865*** 
 (-6.59) (-6.60) (-6.66) (-6.61)    
Investment t-1 -0.033 -0.031 -0.018 -0.022    
 (-0.31) (-0.29) (-0.17) (-0.21)    
Beta t-1 0.561*** 0.563*** 0.559*** 0.561*** 
 (5.21) (5.21) (5.17) (5.19)    
Past Stock Return t-1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001    
 (-1.02) (-1.00) (-1.02) (-1.01)    
Forecast Dispersion t-1 0.258*** 0.256*** 0.258*** 0.257*** 
 (3.36) (3.34) (3.37) (3.35)    
Number of Analysts t-1  -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.041*** -0.042*** 
 (-4.97) (-4.91) (-4.54) (-4.71)    
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 7291 7291 7291 7291    
Adj.R2 0.228 0.228 0.228 0.228    
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Table 3. The Effect of Different Social-Connection Types on Firms’ Cost of Equity 
This table reports the relation between firms’ social connections with analysts and firms’ cost of equity 
capital where social connections are derived from education (Column (1)), past employment (Column 
(2)) and social activity (Column (3)). All standard errors are clustered at the firm level. t-statistics are 
in parentheses. ∗ indicates significance at the 10% level; ∗∗ significance at 5%; ∗∗∗ significance at 1%. 
Variable definitions are provided in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Education t-1 -0.054                  
 (-0.35)                  
Employment t-1  -0.167*                 
  (-1.78)                 
Social Activity t-1   -0.250*** 
   (-2.60)    
Size t-1 -0.038 -0.019 -0.008    
 (-0.86) (-0.41) (-0.16)    
Market-to-Book t-1 -0.070*** -0.069*** -0.069*** 
 (-6.19) (-6.13) (-6.07)    
Leverage t-1 2.686*** 2.693*** 2.685*** 
 (7.91) (7.95) (7.91)    
Profitability t-1 -3.851*** -3.857*** -3.861*** 
 (-6.58) (-6.59) (-6.61)    
Investment t-1 -0.027 -0.030 -0.025    
 (-0.25) (-0.28) (-0.23)    
Beta t-1 0.564*** 0.562*** 0.561*** 
 (5.23) (5.20) (5.20)    
Past Stock Return t-1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001    
 (-0.97) (-1.01) (-0.98)    
Forecast Dispersion t-1 0.250*** 0.253*** 0.256*** 
 (3.28) (3.31) (3.34)    
Number of Analysts t-1 -0.046*** -0.044*** -0.044*** 
 (-5.23) (-5.06) (-5.01)    
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 7291 7291 7291    
Adj.R2 0.227 0.228 0.228    
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Table 4. Soft Information 
This table presents the results of the effect of firms’ social connections with analysts on firms’ cost of 
equity capital conditional on firms’ soft information related to research and development, mergers and 
acquisitions, product market competition, and equity raising. All standard errors are clustered at the 
firm level. t-statistics are in parentheses. ∗ indicates significance at the 10% level; ∗∗ significance at 
5%; ∗∗∗ significance at 1%. Variable definitions are provided in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
 
  Connected? 
#Connection_
Type 
#Brokers_ 
Connected 
#Connections 
R&D     
× R&D t-1 -1.646 -0.776 -0.971** -0.338* 
 (-1.14) (-1.03) (-2.03) (-1.78)    
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 7291 7291 7291 7291    
Adj.R2 0.234 0.234 0.234 0.233    
M&A    
× MA_Value t-1 -0.488** -0.226* -0.154** -0.126** 
 (-1.98) (-1.84) (-2.14) (-2.16)    
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 7291 7291 7291 7291    
Adj.R2 0.233 0.233 0.235 0.235    
Product Market Competition    
× Fluidity t-1 -0.022 -0.007 -0.008  -0.002  
 (-0.87) (-0.62) (-0.81)    (-0.45)    
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 7141 7141 7141 7141    
Adj.R2 0.234 0.234 0.235 0.235    
Equity Raising     
× Equity_Raising t-1 -0.288* -0.080 -0.168** -0.091*   
 (-1.68) (-0.85) (-2.01) (-1.71)    
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 5797 5797 5797 5797    
Adj.R2 0.243 0.243 0.243 0.237    
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Table 5. Information Environment 
This table presents the results of the effect of firms’ social connections with analysts on firms’ cost of 
equity capital conditional on the firm’s information environment where firms’ information environment 
is proxied by firm size, firms’ idiosyncratic volatility, analyst earnings forecast dispersion, and 
probability of informed trading. All standard errors are clustered at the firm level. t-statistics are in 
parentheses. ∗ indicates significance at the 10% level; ∗∗ significance at 5%; ∗∗∗ significance at 1%. 
Variable definitions are provided in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
 
  Connected? 
#Connection_
Type 
#Brokers_ 
Connected 
#Connections 
Firm Size     
× Small_Size t-1 -0.401** -0.179* -0.228*** -0.148**  
 (-2.08) (-1.71) (-2.62) (-2.44)    
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 7291 7291 7291 7291 
Adj.R2 0.229 0.229 0.229 0.229 
Idiosyncratic volatility    
× High_IV t-1 -0.601*** -0.261*** -0.323*** -0.151*** 
 (-3.58) (-2.99) (-4.59) (-3.57)    
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 7129 7129 7129 7129    
Adj.R2 0.239 0.239 0.240 0.239    
Analyst earnings forecast dispersion    
× High_Dispersion t-1 -0.330** -0.094 -0.237*** -0.086**  
 (-1.98) (-1.10) (-3.30) (-2.01)    
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 7291 7291 7291 7291    
Adj.R2 0.238 0.237 0.239 0.237    
Probability of informed trading    
× High_PIN t-1 -0.288* -0.080 -0.168** -0.091*   
 (-1.68) (-0.85) (-2.01) (-1.71)    
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 5797 5797 5797 5797    
Adj.R2 0.243 0.243 0.243 0.237    
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Table 6. Financial Constraints 
 
This table presents the results of the effect of firms’ social connections with analysts on firms’ cost of 
equity capital conditional on firms’ financial constraints where financial constraints are measured based 
on Whited-Wu Index, Hadlock-Pierce Index, Kaplan-Zingales Index and whether the firm is a non-
dividend-payer. All standard errors are clustered at the firm level. t-statistics are in parentheses. ∗ 
indicates significance at the 10% level; ∗∗ significance at 5%; ∗∗∗ significance at 1%. Variable 
definitions are provided in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
 
  
Connected? 
#Connection_
Type 
#Brokers_ 
Connected 
#Connections 
Whited-Wu Index     
× High_WW t-1 -0.440** -0.195** -0.167** -0.093**  
 (-2.56) (-2.18) (-2.27) (-2.18)    
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 7010 7010 7010 7010    
Adj.R2 0.231 0.231 0.231 0.230    
Hadlock-Pierce Index   
× High_HP t-1 -0.311* -0.140 -0.157** -0.084*   
 (-1.71) (-1.6) (-2.01) (-1.77)    
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 7039 7039 7039 7039    
Adj.R2 0.229 0.229 0.229 0.229    
Kaplan-Zingales Index   
× High_KZ t-1 -0.002 -0.018 -0.072 -0.055    
 (-0.01) (-0.21) (-1.01) (-1.36)    
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 6514 6514 6514 6514    
Adj.R2 0.233 0.232 0.233 0.232    
Non-dividend Payer     
× Non_Dividend_Payer t-1 -0.040 -0.191*** -0.161** -0.086*   
 (-0.52) (-2.65) (-2.12) (-1.90)    
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 7291 7291 7291 7291    
Adj.R2 0.228 0.228 0.229 0.229    
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Table 7. Corporate Governance 
 
This table presents the results of the effect of firms’ social connections with analysts on firms’ cost of 
equity capital conditional on firms’ corporate governance where firms’ corporate governance is 
proxied by hostile takeover index, institutional ownership, board independence and CEO pay-for-
performance sensitivity. All standard errors are clustered at the firm level. t-statistics are in 
parentheses. ∗ indicates significance at the 10% level; ∗∗ significance at 5%; ∗∗∗ significance at 1%. 
Variable definitions are provided in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
 
  
Connected? 
#Connection_
Type 
#Brokers_ 
Connected 
#Connections 
Hostile Takeover Index     
× Low_Takeover_Threat t-1 -0.216 -0.244 -0.157** -0.079*   
 (-1.16) (-1.54) (-2.01) (-1.73)    
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 6718 6718 6718 6718    
Adj.R2 0.230 0.230 0.230 0.230    
Institutional Ownership     
× Low_IO t-1 -0.508*** -0.269*** -0.157** -0.109*** 
 (-2.92) (-3.15) (-2.18) (-2.68)    
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 6913 6913 6913 6913    
Adj.R2 0.239 0.239 0.239 0.239    
Board Independence     
× Low_Independence t-1 -0.343** -0.197** -0.190*** -0.107*** 
 (-2.03) (-2.35) (-2.71) (-2.64)    
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 7243 7243 7243 7243    
Adj.R2 0.230 0.230 0.230 0.230    
CEO Pay-For-Performance Sensitivity    
× Low_CEO_PPS t-1 -0.338** -0.134* -0.136** -0.067*   
 (-2.00) (-1.74) (-2.01) (-1.66)    
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 5783 5783 5783 5783    
Adj.R2 0.256 0.257 0.257 0.257    
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Table 8. Difference-in-Differences Regressions 
This table presents the difference-in-differences regression results for brokerage exit and exogenous CEO turnover. Columns 1, 2, 5, and 6 present the results 
based on placebo shocks, in which we falsely assume that the brokerage exit or CEO turnover (i.e., the treatment) occurs three years or two years before it 
actually does. Columns 3, 4, 7 and 8 present the results based on actual brokerage exit or CEO turnover. All standard errors are clustered at the firm level. t-
statistics are in parentheses. ∗ indicates significance at the 10% level; ∗∗ significance at 5%; ∗∗∗ significance at 1%. Variable definitions are provided in Table 
A1 in the Appendix. 
 
  Brokerage Exit   CEO Turnover 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Placebo Actual  Placebo Actual 
 3yr before 2yr before    3yr before 2yr before   
Treat × Postt-1  -0.001 0.001 1.134** 1.217**   -0.015 0.007 1.549*** 1.339*** 
 (-0.15) (0.37) (2.49) (2.52)     (-0.79) (1.08) (3.54) (3.32)    
Size t-1     1.565**      1.618*   
    (2.04)        (1.81)    
Market-to-Book t-1     0.051        -0.067    
    (1.38)        (-0.73)    
Leverage t-1     2.717        -0.269    
    (1.48)        (-0.14)    
Profitability t-1     4.259        1.449    
    (1.61)        (0.67)    
Investment t-1     -0.345        0.230    
    (-0.99)        (0.52)    
Beta t-1     -0.550        -1.075*** 
    (-1.14)        (-3.08)    
Past Stock Return t-1     0.005        -0.006    
    (1.19)        (-1.45)    
Forecast Dispersion t-1     -0.007        -0.268    
    (-0.01)        (-1.19)    
Number of Analysts t-1     -0.017        -0.044    
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    (-0.44)        (-0.94)    
Firm-Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 666 680 688 688     644 650 660 660    
Adj.R2 0.413 0.365 0.406 0.438      0.349 0.378 0.332 0.343    
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Table 9. 2SLS Instrumental-Variable Regressions  
This table presents the 2SLS regression results for brokerage exit (Panel A) and exogenous CEO turnover (Panel B). Columns (1) to (4) of Panels A and B 
present the first-stage regression results, whereas Columns (5) to Columns (8) of Panels A and B present the second-stage regression results. All standard errors 
are clustered at the firm level. t-statistics are in parentheses. ∗ indicates significance at the 10% level; ∗∗ significance at 5%; ∗∗∗ significance at 1%. Variable 
definitions are provided in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
 
Panel A. Brokerage Exit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Connected? 
#Connection
_Type 
#Brokers_ 
Connected 
#Connections   Cost of Equity 
 1st Stage  2nd Stage 
Connected? t-1      -6.235**                    
      (-2.53)                    
#Connection_Type t-1       -3.839***                   
       (-2.66)                   
#Brokers_Connected t-1        -2.542**                  
        (-2.36)                  
#Connections t-1         -1.571**  
         (-2.46)    
Instrumental Variable          
Treat*Post t-1 -0.172*** -0.264*** -0.389*** -0.775***      
 (-3.10) (-2.69) (-2.89) (-3.53)         
Size t-1 -0.043 0.025 -0.083 -0.026     1.261 1.682 1.306 1.525*   
 (-0.46) (0.17) (-0.49) (-0.10)     (1.11) (1.45) (1.29) (1.66)    
Market-to-Book t-1 0.010 0.011 -0.003 -0.009     0.125 0.102 0.041 0.037    
 (1.32) (1.10) (-0.22) (-0.39)     (1.51) (1.44) (0.65) (0.69)    
Leverage t-1 -0.191 -0.121 0.375 0.519     1.363 2.160 3.889 3.532    
 (-0.72) (-0.32) (0.79) (0.82)     (0.49) (0.82) (1.49) (1.55)    
Profitability t-1 -0.036 -0.075 0.606 0.639     4.000 3.914 6.155** 5.262*   
 (-0.24) (-0.23) (1.48) (0.91)     (1.34) (1.31) (2.00) (1.83)    
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Investment t-1 -0.004 0.040 -0.016 0.100     -0.371 -0.163 -0.395 -0.189    
 (-0.09) (0.61) (-0.18) (0.58)     (-0.76) (-0.32) (-0.90) (-0.43)    
Beta t-1 -0.021 -0.098 -0.223** -0.287*    -0.701 -1.001 -1.248* -1.001    
 (-0.41) (-1.12) (-2.33) (-1.86)     (-1.05) (-1.36) (-1.70) (-1.62)    
Past Stock Return t-1 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001     0.006 0.001 0.003 0.003    
 (0.14) (-0.87) (-0.55) (-0.71)     (1.02) (0.20) (0.48) (0.52)    
Forecast Dispersion t-1 0.008 0.001 0.073 0.099     0.049 -0.000 0.222 0.148    
 (0.13) (0.01) (0.89) (0.76)     (0.07) (-0.00) (0.35) (0.27)    
Number of Analysts t-1 0.009* 0.004 0.034*** 0.043*    0.049 -0.000 0.091 0.051    
 (1.93) (0.37) (2.60) (1.82)     (0.77) (-0.00) (1.08) (0.77)    
Firm-Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 688 688 688 688     688 688 688 688    
Adj.R2 0.567 0.670 0.560 0.627      0.481 0.414 0.494 0.570    
 
 
 
  
46 
 
Panel B. Exogenous CEO Turnover 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Connected? 
#Connection
_Type 
#Brokers_
Connected 
#Connections   Cost of Equity 
 1st Stage  2nd Stage 
Connected? t-1      -12.35                   
      (-0.20)                   
#Connection_Type t-1       -2.707**                   
       (-2.24)                   
#Brokers_Connected t-1        -2.424*                  
        (-1.89)                  
#Connections t-1         -1.243**  
         (-2.36)    
Instrumental Variable          
Treat*Post t-1 -0.108 -0.576*** -0.552** -1.368***      
 (-0.88) (-2.94) (-2.20) (-3.20)         
Size t-1 0.046 0.176 0.301 0.189     1.044 2.028** 2.348** 1.803**  
 (0.38) (0.92) (1.44) (0.68)     (1.12) (2.07) (2.37) (1.99)    
Market-to-Book t-1 0.002 -0.010 -0.009 -0.046     -0.065 -0.091 -0.090 -0.113    
 (0.19) (-0.43) (-0.46) (-1.08)     (-0.7) (-0.96) (-0.88) (-1.14)    
Leverage t-1 0.791** 0.473 -0.011 0.773     1.01 0.829 -0.296 0.487    
 (2.38) (0.77) (-0.01) (0.61)     (0.54) (0.34) (-0.11) (0.21)    
Profitability t-1 0.288 1.286** 0.561 1.467     5.27 4.437 2.808 2.885    
 (1.04) (2.49) (0.99) (1.17)     (1.48) (1.57) (1.09) (1.18)    
Investment t-1 0.002 -0.014 0.217** 0.123     0.119 0.197 0.757 0.350    
 (0.03) (-0.11) (2.20) (0.61)     (0.03) (0.33) (1.28) (0.70)    
Beta t-1 0.108 -0.010 0.039 -0.281     -1.27 -1.099** -0.980* -1.350*** 
 (1.37) (-0.09) (0.30) (-1.13)     (-3.71) (-2.53) (-1.92) (-2.83)    
Past Stock Return t-1 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.000     -0.002 -0.007 -0.005 -0.006    
 (-0.12) (-0.68) (0.07) (-0.16)     (-0.91) (-1.55) (-1.03) (-1.19)    
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Forecast Dispersion t-1 0.035 0.067 0.039 -0.013     -0.129 -0.112 -0.173 -0.281    
 (1.04) (0.99) (0.88) (-0.14)     (-0.23) (-0.38) (-0.67) (-1.06)    
Number of Analysts t-1 -0.009 -0.008 -0.016 -0.002     -0.068 -0.062 -0.083 -0.047    
 (-1.33) (-0.75) (-1.36) (-0.11)     (-1.5) (-1.19) (-1.39) (-0.86)    
Firm-Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 660 660 660 660     660 660 660 660    
Adj.R2 0.662 0.739 0.752 0.731      0.347 0.613 0.599 0.672 
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Table 10. Firm Fixed-Effects Regressions  
This table presents the firm fixed-effect regression results of the effect of firms’ social connections with 
analysts on firms’ cost of equity capital. All standard errors are clustered at the firm level. t-statistics 
are in parentheses. ∗ indicates significance at the 10% level; ∗∗ significance at 5%; ∗∗∗ significance at 
1%. Variable definitions are provided in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Connected? t-1 -0.166*                   
 (-1.72)                   
#Connection_Type t-1  -0.105**                  
  (-2.06)                  
#Brokers_Connected t-1   -0.097**                 
   (-2.43)                 
#Connections t-1    -0.052**  
    (-2.19)    
Size t-1 0.495*** 0.494*** 0.499*** 0.495*** 
 (3.54) (3.53) (3.57) (3.54)    
Market-to-Book t-1 -0.024* -0.024* -0.024* -0.024*   
 (-1.89) (-1.88) (-1.88) (-1.87)    
Leverage t-1 1.474*** 1.478*** 1.463*** 1.466*** 
 (3.13) (3.13) (3.10) (3.11)    
Profitability t-1 -1.261* -1.255* -1.272* -1.260*   
 (-1.92) (-1.91) (-1.94) (-1.92)    
Investment t-1 -0.051 -0.049 -0.044 -0.045    
 (-0.48) (-0.47) (-0.42) (-0.42)    
Beta t-1 -0.095 -0.093 -0.094 -0.093    
 (-0.96) (-0.94) (-0.96) (-0.94)    
Past Stock Return t-1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001    
 (-0.99) (-0.99) (-1.00) (-1.00)    
Forecast Dispersion t-1 0.018 0.017 0.019 0.018    
 (0.24) (0.23) (0.25) (0.24)    
Number of Analysts t-1 -0.008 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007    
 (-0.84) (-0.82) (-0.67) (-0.74)    
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 7291 7291 7291 7291    
Adj.R2 0.444 0.444 0.444 0.444    
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Table 11. Alternative Cost-of-Equity Measures 
 
This table presents the results of the effect of firm-brokerage social connections on firms’ cost of equity 
using alternative measures of cost of equity, including estimating cost of equity using earnings 
forecasted from the residual income model by Li and Monhanram (2014) (Panel A) and from the Hou, 
Van Dijk and Zhang (2012) model (Panel B), using Fama-French three-factor model (Panel C) and 
excluding firms with analysts’ forecast bias in the top 30% of the distribution (Panel D). All standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level. t-statistics are in parentheses. ∗ indicates significance at the 10% 
level; ∗∗ significance at 5%; ∗∗∗ significance at 1%. Variable definitions are provided in Table A1 in 
the Appendix. 
 
Panel A.  Cost of equity estimated using earnings forecasted from the RI model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Connected? t-1 -0.941**                   
 (-2.18)                   
#Connection_Type t-1  -0.713***                  
  (-3.21)                  
#Brokers_Connected t-1   -0.367**                 
   (-1.99)                 
#Connections t-1    -0.318*** 
    (-2.90)    
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 6284 6284 6284 6284    
Adj.R2 0.117 0.118 0.117 0.117    
 
Panel B.  Cost of equity estimated using earnings forecasted from the HVZ model 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Connected? t-1 -1.079***                   
 (-2.59)                   
#Connection_Type t-1  -0.802***                  
  (-3.67)                  
#Brokers_Connected t-1   -0.722***                 
   (-3.75)                 
#Connections t-1    -0.452*** 
    (-3.82)    
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 6280 6280 6280 6280    
Adj.R2 0.116 0.118 0.118 0.118    
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Panel C.  Cost of equity estimated using Fama-French three-factor model   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Connected? t-1 -0.410***                   
 (-2.12)                   
#Connection_Type t-1  -0.219***                  
  (-2.05)                  
#Brokers_Connected t-1   -0.225***                 
   (-2.41)                 
#Connections t-1    -0.131*** 
    (-2.31)    
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 7291 7291 7291 7291    
Adj.R2 0.252 0.252 0.252 0.252    
 
Panel D. Excluding firms with analysts’ forecast bias in the top 30% of the distribution 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Connected? t-1 -0.264**                   
 (-2.29)                   
#Connection_Type t-1  -0.139**                  
  (-2.32)                  
#Brokers_Connected t-1   -0.133***                 
   (-2.76)                 
#Connections t-1    -0.066**  
    (-2.39)    
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 5091 5091 5091 5091    
Adj.R2 0.244 0.244 0.245 0.244    
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Appendix  
Table A1. Variable Definitions 
Variables Definitions  
Cost of Equity The average of cost of equity estimates (in percentage points) from 
four models, including Claus and Thomas (2001), Gebhardt, Lee and 
Swaminathan  (2001), Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) and Easton 
(2004). Data are from IBES, Compustat and CRSP. 
  
Connected? An indicator for the existence of any types of social connections 
between a firm and at least one broker among those who follow the 
firm (BoardEx). 
  
#Connection_Type The number of brokerage houses that follow the firm and are socially 
connected with the focal firm (BoardEx). 
  
#Brokers_Connected The number of brokerage houses that follow the firm and are socially 
connected with the focal firm (BoardEx). 
  
#Connections The total number of social connections between a focal firm and 
individual brokerage houses (BoardEx). 
  
Education An indicator for the existence of educational ties between a firm and 
at least one broker among those who follow the firm (BoardEx). 
  
Employment An indicator for the existence of employment ties between a firm and 
at least one broker among those who follow the firm (BoardEx). 
  
Social Activity An indicator for the existence of social activity ties between a firm and 
at least one broker among those who follow the firm (BoardEx). 
  
Size The natural logarithm of total assets (Compustat: AT) in $ millions 
(adjusted for 2016 real dollars).  
  
Market-to-Book  Market value of equity divide by book value of equity (Compustat: 
CSHO*PRCC_F/CEQ). 
  
Profitability Income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets (Compustat: 
IB/AT). 
  
Leverage  The total of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities divided by 
total assets (Compustat: (DLTT+DLC)/AT). 
  
Investment Following Cooper, Gulen and Schill (2008), the firm-level asset 
investment is measured in 1-year percentage change in total firm 
assets (Compustat: (AT-lagged AT)/lagged AT) 
  
Beta Market beta obtained from regressions of a firm’s monthly excess 
stock returns on the corresponding CRSP value-weighted index excess 
returns using at least 24 months and up to 60 months ending in June 
of each year. Excess returns are monthly returns minus the 1-month 
Treasury bill rate (CRSP). 
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Past Stock Return Firm's buy-and-hold stock return in percentage points for the financial 
year (CRSP).  
  
Forecast Dispersion The monthly average of the inter-analyst standard deviation of analyst 
earnings forecasts scaled by absolute mean forecasts for a year (IBES) 
  
Analyst Following The number of analysts following a firm during a year (IBES) 
  
Idiosyncratic Volatility  Following Ang, Hodrick, Xing and Zhang (2006), idiosyncratic 
volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of the residuals from 
regressing the stock’s returns in excess of the one-month Treasury bill 
rate on the Fama-French (1993) 3 factors (CRSP). 
  
Probability of Informed 
Trading (PIN) 
Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara’s (2002) probability of informed 
trading measure (TAQ) 
  
Small_Size An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm’s size is below the 
median of the year, and 0 otherwise 
  
High_IV An indicator variable that equals 1 if firms’ idiosyncratic volatility is 
above the median of the year, and 0 otherwise 
  
High_Dispersion An indicator variable that equals 1 if analyst forecast dispersion is 
above the median of the year, and 0 otherwise 
  
High_PIN An indicator variable that equals 1 if the probability of informed 
trading (PIN) is above the median of the year, and 0 otherwise 
  
Kaplan-Zingales Index As –1.001909[(IB + DP)/lagged PPENT] + 0.2826389[ (AT + 
PRCC_F×CSHO - CEQ - TXDB)/AT] + 3.139193[(DLTT + 
DLC)/(DLTT + DLC + SEQ)] – 39.3678[(DVC + DVP)/lagged 
PPENT] – 1.314759[CHE/lagged PPENT], where all variables are 
Compustat data items. 
  
Whited-Wu Index As –0.091 [(IB + DP)/AT] – 0.062[indicator set to one if DVC + DVP 
is positive, and zero otherwise] + 0.021[DLTT/AT] – 0.044[log(AT)] 
+ 0.102[average industry sales growth, estimated separately for each 
three-digit SIC industry and each year, with sales growth defined as 
above] – 0.035[sales growth], where all variables are Compustat data 
items. 
  
Hadlock-Pierce Index As –0.737Size + 0.043Size2 – 0.040Age, where Size equals the log of 
inflation-adjusted Compustat item AT (in 2016 dollars), and Age is 
the number of years the firm is listed with a non-missing stock price 
on Compustat. In calculating the index, we follow Hadlock and Pierce 
and cap Size at (the log of) $4.5 billion and Age at 37 years. 
  
Non-Dividend Payer Takes value of 1 if a firm pays no dividends at the end of the fiscal 
year, and 0 otherwise (Compustat: DVC). 
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High_WW An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm’s financial constraints 
level calculated based on the Whited-Wu Index is above the median 
of the year, and 0 otherwise. 
  
High_HP An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm’s financial constraints 
level calculated based on the Hadlock-Pierce Index is above the 
median of the year, and 0 otherwise. 
  
High_KZ An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm’s financial constraints 
level calculated based on the Kaplan-Zingales Index is above the 
median of the year, and 0 otherwise. 
  
Hostile Takeover Index The firm-level index of takeover susceptibility by Cain, McKeon and 
Solomon (2017).  
  
Board Independence The percentage of independent directors on board (Execucomp). 
  
Institutional Ownership The fraction of shares outstanding held by all institutional investors 
(Thomson Reuters 13F)  
  
CEO Pay-for-Performance 
Sensitivity 
The fraction of performance pay relative to total compensation 
(Compustat: ExecuComp (TDC1-SALARY)/TDC1).  
  
Low_Takeover_Threat An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm’s takeover threats are 
below the median of the year, and 0 otherwise. 
  
Low_IO An indicator variable that equals 1if the firm’s institutional ownership 
is below the median of the year, and 0 otherwise. 
  
Low_Independence An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm’s board independence is 
below the median of the year, and 0 otherwise. 
  
Low_CEO_PPS An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm’s CEO pay-for-
performance-sensivity is below the median of the year, and 0 
otherwise. 
R&D Research and Development expenses scaled by total assets 
(Compustat: XRD/AT). 
MA_Value The total value of M&A transactions the firm made in the year scaled 
by total assets (Compustat; Thomson One SDC). 
Fluidity Hoberg, Phillips and Prabhala’s (2014) product market fluidity 
measure.  
Equity_Raising Following McLean and Zhao (2014), the change in book equity, plus 
the change in deferred taxes, minus the change in retained earnings, 
all scaled by lagged assets (Compustat: (∆CEQ + ∆TXDB - 
∆RE)/lagged AT). 
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Table A2. Baseline Regression Results in a Broad Compustat/CRSP/IBES Merged Sample 
This table reports the relation between firms’ social connections with analysts and firms’ cost of equity 
capital for all firms (both with and without history of social connections) in a merged sample from 
Compustat/CRSP/IBES. Social connections are measured using an indicator variable capturing whether 
a firm is socially connected with analysts (Connected?) in Column (1), the number of social connection 
types (#Connection_Type) in Column (2), the number of connected brokerage houses 
(#Brokers_Connected ) in Column (3), and the total number of social connections (#Connections) in 
Column (4). All standard errors are clustered at the firm level. t-statistics are in parentheses. ∗ indicates 
significance at the 10% level; ∗∗ significance at 5%; ∗∗∗ significance at 1%. Variable definitions are 
provided in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Connected? t-1 -0.596***    
 (-7.02)    
#Connection_Type t-1  -0.264***   
  (-5.69)   
#Brokers_Connected t-1   -0.236***  
   (-5.43)  
#Connections t-1    -0.111*** 
    (-4.31) 
Size t-1 -0.164*** -0.163*** -0.165*** -0.166*** 
 (-5.65) (-5.58) (-5.68) (-5.68) 
Market-to-Book t-1 -0.098*** -0.098*** -0.099*** -0.099*** 
 (-9.47) (-9.48) (-9.52) (-9.54) 
Leverage t-1 3.005*** 3.004*** 2.998*** 3.001*** 
 (11.77) (11.77) (11.75) (11.75) 
Profitability t-1 -5.030*** -5.031*** -5.032*** -5.027*** 
 (-11.97) (-11.96) (-11.98) (-11.95) 
Investment t-1 0.274*** 0.273*** 0.280*** 0.277*** 
 (3.08) (3.06) (3.14) (3.10) 
Beta t-1 0.185** 0.187** 0.187** 0.189** 
 (2.52) (2.53) (2.54) (2.57) 
Past Stock Return t-1 -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (-5.07) (-5.05) (-5.07) (-5.05) 
Forecast Dispersion t-1 0.332*** 0.332*** 0.333*** 0.333*** 
 (7.08) (7.08) (7.09) (7.09) 
Number of Analysts t-1 -0.074*** -0.076*** -0.076*** -0.078*** 
 (-12.76) (-13.03) (-12.96) (-13.31) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 31024 31024 31024 31024 
Adj.R2 0.170 0.169 0.169 0.169 
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Table A3. The Effect of Firm-brokerage social connections on Firms’ Equity Valuation 
This table reports the relation between firms’ social connections with analysts and firms’ market-to-
book equity ratio (Market-to-Book) where social connections are measured using an indicator variable 
capturing whether a firm is socially connected with analysts (Connected?) in Column (1), the number 
of social connection types (#Connection_Type) in Column (2), the number of connected brokerage 
houses (#Brokers_Connected ) in Column (3), and the total number of social connections 
(#Connections) in Column (4). All standard errors are clustered at the firm level. t-statistics are in 
parentheses. ∗ indicates significance at the 10% level; ∗∗ significance at 5%; ∗∗∗ significance at 1%. 
Variable definitions are provided in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Connected? 0.422***                   
 (3.16)                   
#Connection_Type  0.319***                  
  (3.90)                  
#Brokers_Connected   0.233***                 
   (3.24)                 
#Connections    0.184*** 
    (4.07)    
     
Size -0.516*** -0.556*** -0.525*** -0.561*** 
 (-6.18) (-6.46) (-6.22) (-6.55)    
Leverage 0.933 0.942 0.966 0.977    
 (1.09) (1.10) (1.12) (1.14)    
Profitability 6.019*** 6.036*** 6.064*** 6.053*** 
 (5.38) (5.39) (5.43) (5.41)    
Investment 0.620*** 0.620*** 0.598*** 0.600*** 
 (3.80) (3.81) (3.65) (3.65)    
Beta 0.179 0.178 0.184 0.183    
 (1.10) (1.09) (1.13) (1.12)    
Past Stock Return 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 
 (8.50) (8.47) (8.51) (8.50)    
Forecast Dispersion -0.046 -0.048 -0.047 -0.051    
 (-0.46) (-0.48) (-0.47) (-0.50)    
Number of Analysts  0.116*** 0.113*** 0.111*** 0.109*** 
 (8.29) (8.07) (7.85) (7.74)    
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 7291 7291 7291 7291    
Adj.R2 0.120 0.121 0.120 0.121    
     
 
 
 
 
